Republic of the
Supreme Court
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Miguel
Beluso, |
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G.R. No. 153974 |
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NATIVIDAD Beluso,
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PEDRO BELUSO, |
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Angelita
Beluso, |
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RAMON Beluso,
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Present: |
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and AMADA DANIEL, |
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substituted by her heirs |
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represented by TERESITA |
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PANGANIBAN, CJ.,
Chairperson, |
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ARROBANG, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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Petitioners, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO, SR. and |
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- versus - |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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THE MUNICIPALITY OF |
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PANAY (CAPIZ), represented |
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by its Mayor, VICENTE B. |
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Promulgated: |
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August 7,
2006 |
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Respondent. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before this Court is a petition for
review questioning the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The facts are as follows:
Petitioners are owners of parcels of
land with a total area of about 20,424 square meters, covered by Free Patent
Nos. 7265, 7266, 7267, 7268, 7269, and 7270.[3] On
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the taking is not for public use but only for the benefit of
certain individuals; that it is politically motivated because petitioners voted
against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed
beneficiaries of the land sought to be expropriated have not actually signed a
petition asking for the property but their signatures were forged or they were
misled into signing the same.[6]
On
Petitioners filed an Answer on
On
Petitioners then filed on March 2,
1998 a Petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming that they were
denied due process when the trial court declared that the taking was for public
purpose without receiving evidence on petitioners’ claim that the Mayor of
Panay was motivated by politics in expropriating their property and in denying
their Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners;
and that the trial court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it
disregarded the affidavits of persons denying that they signed a petition
addressed to the municipal government of Panay.[12]
On January 17, 2001, petitioners filed a
Motion to Admit Attached Memorandum and the Memorandum itself where they argued
that based on the Petition for Expropriation filed by respondent, such
expropriation was based only on a resolution and not on an ordinance contrary
to Sec. 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160; there was also no valid and
definite offer to buy the property as the price offered by respondent to the
petitioners was very low.[13]
On
Thus, the
present petition claiming that:
A. RESPONDENT IS WITHOUT, LACKS
AND DOES NOT HAVE THE LAWFUL POWER TO ACQUIRE ANY OR ALL OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES THROUGH EMINENT DOMAIN, IT BEING EXERCISED BY MEANS OF A MERE
RESOLUTION, AND NOT THROUGH AN ORDINANCE AS REQUIRED BY LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE;
B. RESPONDENT IS LIKEWISE
WITHOUT, LACKS AND DOES NOT HAVE THE LAWFUL POWER TO ACQUIRE ANY OR ALL OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH EMINENT DOMAIN, ITS PREVIOUS OFFER TO BUY THEM BEING
NOT VALID; and
C. IT WAS A SERIOUS ERROR ON
THE PART OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS NOT TO DISCUSS, MUCH LESS RULE ON,
BOTH IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION AND ITS RESOLUTION PROMULGATED ON 11 JUNE 2002
PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS THAT RESPONDENT IS WITHOUT, LACKS AND DOES NOT HAVE THE
LAWFUL POWER TO ACQUIRE ANY OR ALL OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH EMINENT
DOMAIN, IT BEING EXERCISED BY MEANS OF A MERE RESOLUTION, AND NOT THROUGH AN
ORDINANCE AS REQUIRED BY LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, AND ITS PREVIOUS
OFFER TO BUY THEM BEING NOT VALID, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THESE OBJECTIONS WERE
PROPERLY PLEADED IN PETITIONERS’ MEMORANDUM WHICH WAS DULY ADMITTED IN ITS
RESOLUTION PROMULGATED ON 29 JANUARY 2001; and
D. PETITIONERS WERE UTTERLY DENIED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE COURT A QUO, WHEN IT SIMPLY
DECLARED IN ITS ORDER DATED 31 JULY 1997 THAT THE TAKING BY RESPONDENT OF
PETITIONERS’ PROPERTIES IS PURPORTEDLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE WITHOUT RECEIVING
EVIDENCE ON THEIR ASSERTED CLAIM THAT RESPONDENT’S MUNICIPAL MAYOR WAS
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED IN SEEKING THE EXPROPRIATION OF THEIR PROPERTIES AND NOT
FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE.[16]
Petitioners argue that: contrary to Sec. 19 of R.A. No.
7160 of the Local Government Code, which provides that a local government may
exercise the power of eminent domain only by “ordinance,” respondent’s
expropriation in this case is based merely on a “resolution”; while objection
on this ground was neither raised by petitioners in their Motion to Dismiss nor
in their Answer, such objection may still be considered by this Court since the
fact upon which it is based is apparent from the petition for expropriation
itself; a defense may be favorably considered even if not raised in an
appropriate pleading so long as the facts upon which it is based are
undisputed; courts have also adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving
questions involving the proper exercise of local bodies of the delegated power
of expropriation, as compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the
national legislature; respondent failed to give, prior to the petition for
expropriation, a previous valid and definite offer to petitioners as the amount
offered in this case was only P10.00 per square meter, when the
properties are residential in nature and command a much higher price; the CA
failed to discuss and rule upon the arguments raised by petitioners in their
Memorandum; attached to the Motion to Dismiss were affidavits and death
certificates showing that there were people whose names were in the supposed
petition asking respondent for land, but who did not actually sign the same,
thus showing that the present expropriation was not for a public purpose but
was merely politically motivated; considering the conflicting claims regarding
the purpose for which the properties are being expropriated and inasmuch as
said issue may not be rightfully ruled upon merely on the basis of petitioners’
Motion to Dismiss and Answer as well as respondent’s Petition for Expropriation,
what should have been done was for the RTC to conduct hearing where each party
is given ample opportunity to prove its claim.[17]
Respondent for its part contends that its power to acquire private property for public use upon payment of just compensation was correctly upheld by the trial court; that the CA was correct in finding that the petitioners were not denied due process, even though no hearing was conducted in the trial court, as petitioners were still able to adduce their objections and defenses therein; and that petitioners’ arguments have been passed upon by both the trial court and the CA and were all denied for lack of substantial merit.[18]
Respondent filed a Memorandum quoting at length the decision of the CA to support its position.[19] Petitioners meanwhile opted to have the case resolved based on the pleadings already filed.[20]
We find the
petition to be impressed with merit.
Eminent
domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the
legislature.[21] While such power may be validly delegated to local
government units (LGUs), other public entities and public utilities the
exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute.[22] In fact, the scope of delegated legislative
power is narrower than that of the delegating authority and such entities may
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to its control and restraints imposed through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.[23] Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent
power of eminent domain.[24] Thus,
strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in
reality not eminent but “inferior” since it must conform to the limits imposed
by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.[25] The national legislature is still the
principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principal’s will or
modify the same.[26]
The
exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental right.[27] It greatly affects a landowner’s right to
private property which is a constitutionally protected right necessary for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and is intimately connected
with the rights to life and liberty.[28] Thus, whether such power is exercised
directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of such power
must undergo painstaking scrutiny.[29]
Indeed,
despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is
still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain
is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
Sec. 19 of
R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain expressly
provides:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A
local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government
unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.
It is clear
therefore that several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain, to wit:
1. An ordinance is enacted by
the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain
is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
and the landless.
3. There is payment of just
compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.[30]
The Court
in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
lawmaking body.[31] R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will
not suffice.[32]
A
resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private
property; and the reason for this is settled:
x x x A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses
a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not
for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent
domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of
the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence
from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.] 7160
categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an
ordinance. x x x[33]
As
respondent’s expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such
expropriation is clearly defective. While
the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the
court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGU’s exercise of its delegated
power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.[34]
The Court
notes that petitioners failed to raise this point at the earliest
opportunity. Still, we are not precluded
from considering the same. This Court
will not hesitate to consider matters even those raised for the first time on
appeal in clearly meritorious situations,[35]
such as in this case.
Thus, the
Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioners.
It is well
to mention however that despite our ruling in this case respondent is not
barred from instituting similar proceedings in the future, provided that it
complies with all legal requirements.[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47052 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Action No. V-6958 is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, rollo, pp. 139-145.
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 9-10.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] CA rollo, pp. 7,11.
[13]
[14] Rollo, pp. 142-145.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 384 Phil. 676, 687 (2000); Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 354 Phil. 684, 691 (1998); see also Antonio v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 124779, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 340, 350.
[22] Heirs
of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, supra at 689; Municipality of
Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 691; Lagcao v. Labra,
G.R. No. 155746,
[23] Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, supra; Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 691.
[24] Lagcao v. Labra, supra at 284.
[25] Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 695.
[26]
[27] Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 694.
[28] Lagcao v. Labra, supra at 285.
[29]
[30] Antonio v. Geronimo, supra at 351; Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 692.
[31] Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 687; Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, supra; Antonio v. Geronimo, supra at 352.
[32] Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 687.
[33]
[34] Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, supra at 693.
[35] Villanueva
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 143286,
[36] Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, supra at 697; Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, supra at 693.